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for PostThe Responsibility
Conflict Reforms:
A Critical Assessment of Jus Post
Bellum as a Legal Concept
Dr. Eric De Brabandere*

ABSTRACT

The increasing involvement of international actors in
various forms of international missions set up to supervise
reconstruction or peace-building processes has raised many
questions with respect to both the legal framework applicable to
such activity and the authority to engage in such reforms.
Recently, new normative propositions on the subject have been
labelled jus post bellum. This Article challenges the usefulness
and accuracy of jus post bellum as a legal concept. Such
theories either amount to an explicit or implicit challenge of the
crucial objectivity of the post-conflict phase by linking the rights
and obligations of foreign actors to the legality of the use of
force, or they simply bring together previously existing
obligations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The reconstruction processes in Kosovo, East Timor,
Afghanistan, and Iraq are some of the most important examples of
comprehensive international efforts to rebuild societies emerging
from years of conflict and civil strife. The emphasis that the United
Nations and other international actors have placed on the postconflict phase is a recent phenomenon in international law and
clearly contrasts with previous "non-interventionist" approaches to
conflicts in which the accent lay too much on negotiating and
maintaining a ceasefire, with scant attention paid to addressing the
very reasons behind the conflict. The increasing involvement of
international actors in various forms of international missions to
supervise reconstruction or peace-building processes has raised many
questions regarding the applicable legal framework, in terms of both
the rights and obligations of the actors involved in the post-conflict
phase and the content of reconstruction and reform.' The increasing

See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KELLY, RESTORING AND MAINTAINING ORDER IN
1.
COMPLEX PEACE OPERATIONS: THE SEARCH FOR A LEGAL FRAMEWORK (1999) (discussing

and analyzing such questions); Patrick Gavigan, Introduction to HONORING HUMAN
RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL MANDATES: LESSONS FROM BOSNIA, KOSOVO AND EAST
TIMOR 3, 6-10 (Alice Henkin ed., 2003) (reflecting on the post-conflict security strategy
and the implementation of a post-conflict legal framework in light of the U.N. peace
operations in Kosovo and East Timor); T. H. Irmscher, The Legal Framework for the
Activities of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: The
Charter, Human Rights, and the Law of Occupation, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INVL L. 353
(2001); Antonio F. Perez, Legal Frameworks for Economic Transition in IraqOccupation Under the Law of War us. Global Governance Under the Law of Peace, 18
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role of foreign states and international organizations in these
processes is undeniable. However, scholars often claim that the focus
on the activities in post-conflict scenarios has resulted in a "legal
void" in the transition from war or conflict to peace because the
traditional difference between the law applicable in war and the law
applicable in peacetime is considered no longer relevant. 2 Several
scholars have drawn attention to the need to move toward a distinct
discipline on the law after conflict-jus post bellum-a systemic
adaptation of the current division between the "law of war" and the
"law of peace." Although jus post bellum resurfaced principally in
political philosophy3 and ethics, 4 international legal scholars have
taken up the case for a renewed attention to and recognition of jus
post bellum as legal concept.5
This Article challenges the existence and usefulness of jus post
bellum as a legal concept.
The importance of post-conflict
reconstruction and the evolution of the United Nations' and states'
policies geared toward tackling the root causes of conflicts are beyond
doubt. The factual changes in the international law relating to the
maintenance of peace and security and the need to tackle the rootcauses of conflicts are irrefutable. However, the suggested normative
implications of this evolution are troubling.
While some legal
scholars claim that it is premature to include jus post bellum in the
law relating to the use of force,6 I argue that jus post bellum theories
are detrimental to certain fundamental principles of international
law and are not necessarily constructive in the current debate on
post-conflict legal frameworks because they either amount to a

TRANSNAT'L LAW. 53 (2004-2005) (analyzing the limits imposed by the law of war and
the options available under international occupation).
2.
See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, 'Jus ad Bellum, 'Jus in Bello'. . . Jus Post
Bellum?-Rethinking the Conception of the Law of Armed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L.
921, 923-24 (2007) (exploring the "bipolar peace and war distinction"). But see
Alexander Orakhelashvili, Legal Stability and Claims of Change: The International
Court's Treatment of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, 75 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 371 (2006)
(discussing the consistency of the International Court of Justice's jurisprudence in
respect of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello as undermining arguments relating to
legal change in these fields).
3.
See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 122-23 (1977)
(discussing how the theory of ends in war is consistent with jus ad bellum).
4.
See, e.g., Brian Orend, Jus Post Bellum, 31 J. Soc. PHIL. 117-37 (2000)
[hereinafter Orend, Jus Post Bellum] (advocating for the inclusion of jus post bellum
into just war theory); Brian Orend, Jus Post Bellum: The Perspective of a Just-War
Theorist, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 572 (2007) [hereinafter Orend, Just-War Theorist]
(discussing the implications of jus post bellum on international law).
5.
See, e.g., JUs POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM
CONFLICT TO PEACE (Carsten Stahn & Jann Kleffner eds., 2008) (introducing collection
of several articles discussing "the origins, contents and contemporary challenges of jus
post bellum").
6.
Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the
Just War, 34 REV. INT'L STUD. 601, 602 (2008).
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challenge of the crucial neutral stance in the post-conflict phase or
simply bring together already existing obligations under a new name.
Part II briefly depicts the factual context in which this debate
must be situated, namely the evolution of dealing with post-conflict
situations. Part III addresses the legal responsibilities and authority
in post-conflict reconstruction. The analysis of the legal authority in
post-conflict situations will evaluate the existing rules on
responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction, namely the laws of
occupation and the role of the Security Council. Part IV challenges
existing conceptions of jus post bellum as a legal notion. Part IV.A
addresses how such theories frequently link jus post bellum to the
legality or "justness" of the use of force, leading to an explicit or
implicit reintroduction of just war theories in international law. Part
IV.B tackles the usefulness of jus post bellum as an "objective" notion
pertaining to the legal framework containing rules and principles
applicable to post-conflict peace building.

II. PEACEKEEPING, PEACEMAKING AND POST-CONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING

United Nations mission mandates have substantially evolved
throughout the years. The differences between the first "traditional"
United Nations peacekeeping operations and cases such as Kosovo
and East Timor reveal that the United Nations' role has evolved from
the interposition of neutral military contingents in a conflict to the
supervision of long-term, post-conflict reconstruction processes.
Traditionally, the United Nations' task in conflict or post-conflict
situations was limited to the deployment of military personnel and a
limited number of civilian staff to assist or advise the existing
governmental structures. 7
Recent peace-building or post-conflict
reconstruction missions are the latest manifestation of the evolution
in the approach toward situations presenting a potential threat to
international peace and security.
Operations in the 1990s
underestimated the importance of political, economic, social, and civil
reconstruction in building a sustainable peace.8
The growing
awareness of the interrelatedness of political affairs, economy, social

7.
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-GeneralPursuant to the
Statement Adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992:
An Agenda for Peace Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping, 1 20,
delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/24111, A/47/277 (June 17, 1992). The
Secretary-General's report contains the rather formal definition of peacekeeping given
by former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali: "[T]he deployment of a United Nations
presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally
involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as
well." Id.
8.
Roland Paris, Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON
THE UNITED NATIONS 404, 417 (Thomas G. Weiss & Sam Daws eds., 2007).
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services, and governance resulted in the gradual introduction of such
elements in peacekeeping activities. A report by former SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan summarized the evolution from peacekeeping to
peace-building as follows:
While United Nations efforts have been tailored so that they are
palpable to the population to meet the immediacy of their security
needs and to address the grave injustices of war, the root causes of
conflict have often been left unaddressed. Yet, it is in addressing the
causes of conflict, through legitimate and just ways, that the
international community can help prevent a return to conflict in the
9
future.

The United Nations' experience in Cambodia in the 1990s can be seen
as the starting point of this development. The United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was given a mandate
with limited legislative power that included many aspects related to
human rights-the organization and conduct of free and fair
elections; military arrangements; limited civil administration; the
maintenance of law and order; the repatriation and resettlement of
Cambodian refugees and internally displaced persons; and the
rehabilitation of essential Cambodian infrastructure.1 0
Many
subsequent operations-such as the second United Nations Operation
in Somalia (UNOSOM II);11 the United Nations Mission in Bosnia
and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) in combination with a United Nations
International Police Task Force (IPTF);12 and the United Nations
Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) 13-were
equally granted some administrative and legislative powers.

9.
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the Rule of Law
and TransitionalJustice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, 4, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004).
10.
Agreement on the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia
Conflict, art. 6, Annex I, U.N. Doc. S/23177, A/46/608 (Oct. 23, 1991) (authorized under
S.C. Res. 745, U.N. Doc. S/RES/745 (Feb. 28, 1992)).
11.
S.C. Res. 814,
4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/814 (Mar. 26, 1993) (explaining that
the mandate was not limited to humanitarian assistance and the observation of the
cease-fire agreement, but also included elements of restoration of the state's
institutions, such as providing assistance in the reorganization of the police and
judicial system and in the political process in Somalia); see also S.C. Res. 897, 2, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/897 (Jan. 31, 1994) (same).
12.
S.C. Res. 1035, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1035 (Dec. 21, 1995). The IPTF's main
objectives were to monitor, observe and inspect law enforcement activities and
facilities, and to advise and train law enforcement personnel. UNMIBH was given a
limited civilian mandate, mainly aimed at the co-ordination of UN activity in the field
of humanitarian relief, refugees, human rights, elections, rehabilitation of
infrastructure and economic reconstruction. General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia
and Herzegovina, Annex 11, U.N. Doc. S/1995/999 (Dec. 14 1995); The SecretaryGeneral, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuantto Security Council Resolution 1026
(1995), delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1995/1031 (Dec. 13, 1995).
13.
S.C. Res. 1023, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1023 (Nov. 22, 1995). The mission was
inter alia mandated to undertake tasks relating to civil administration and to the
functioning of public services, economic reconstruction and to organize elections, assist
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Within this evolution, international administrations hold a
special place. The cases of Kosovo and East Timor are, to a certain
extent, a culmination of this evolution since the United Nations has
taken over the entire administration of a territory in post-conflict
scenarios. 14 It is this particular type of operation that has prompted
many discussions on the legal obligations of the United Nations and
other international actors. Following NATO's armed intervention in
Kosovo in March 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244
(1999), establishing the United Nations Interim Administration
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).' 5 Resolution 1244 called upon UNMIK
to promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and selfgovernment in Kosovo; perform basic civilian administrative
functions; support the reconstruction of key infrastructure; maintain
civil law and order; promote human rights; and assure the safe return
of all refugees and displaced persons. 16 UNMIK's competences
included full legislative and executive power in the areas of
responsibility laid out in Resolution 1244.17 A few months later, the
Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations
An earlier
Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET).1 8
"popular consultation" among the East Timorese revealed a clear
wish to begin a process of transitioning towards independence.19 In
the transitional process, UNTAET was endowed with overall
responsibility for the administration of East Timor and empowered to
exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the
administration of justice. 20 In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United
Nations was not granted any direct administrative powers. The
Afghan post-conflict reconstruction process relied principally on local
capacity with minimal international participation.2 1 In Iraq, on the
other hand, the occupying forces exercised administrative powers

in their conduct, and certify the results. To that end, the transitional administrator
was also granted legislative power. Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 1026 (1995), supra note 12, 17.
See M. J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, 95
14.
AM. J. INT'L L.76, 76 (2001) (describing the UN's role in the governance of various
societies affected by conflicts); Matthias Ruffert, The Administration of Kosovo and
East-Timor by the International Community, 3 INT'L & COM. L.Q. 613, 622-27 (2001)
(focusing specifically on Kosovo and East-Timor).
15.
S.C. Res. 1244, Annex 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999).
Id.
11(a)-(k).
16.
17.
Constitutional
Framework
for
Provisional
Self-Government,
UNMIK/REG/2001/9, ch. 5 (May 15, 2001), available at http://www.unmikonline.org/
regulations/2001/reg09-01.htm.
S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1272 (Oct. 25, 1999).
18.
Id.
19.
20.
Id.
1.
See Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
21.
Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, U.N. Doc. S/2001/1154 (Dec.
5, 2001) (providing a structure for the interim government while "[aicknowledging the
right of the people of Afghanistan to freely determine their own political future.").
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based on both the laws of occupation and Security Council
resolutions. 22
An analysis of the mandates entrusted to recent international
administrations and subsequent reconstruction missions such as
Afghanistan and Iraq clearly reveals an unambiguous aim to
introduce democracy into these states and territories.2 3 More recent
peace-building missions with less intrusive administrative mandates
are equally centered on the creation or reinforcement of democratic
states. One of the tasks of the 2004 Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH),
for example, is to support "the constitutional and political process ...
and foster principles and democratic governance and institutional
development." 24 Although the link between democracy and peace
remains controversial, it was explicitly taken up by the former United
Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his "Agenda for
Democratisation," in which he observed that "[d]emocratic
institutions and processes . . . minimiz[e] the risk that differences or
disputes will erupt into armed conflict or confrontation. . . . In this

way, a culture of democracy is fundamentally a culture of peace."25
The United Nations' role in relation to peace and security has shifted
undoubtedly from purely preserving peace and security to building
peace and security through a systematic insistence on democratic
This evolution is linked to the United Nations'
governance.
involvement in the maintenance of peace and security and is not
necessarily related to the pre-existence of an international armed
conflict. The authority of international actors-foreign states and
international organizations-to exercise intrusive functions only
results from a delegation of this competence by the Security
It is more than doubtful that victory confers any
Council. 26
or
obligations in the post-conflict phase.
entitlement

S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
22.
See M. Cogen & E. De Brabandere, Democratic Governance and Post
23.
Conflict Reconstruction, 20 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 669, 674 (2007) (noting the trend of UNmandated missions growing involvement in "introducing democratic governance" into
countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq); J. d'Aspremont, Post-Conflict Administrations
as Democracy-Building Instruments, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2008) (analyzing modern
democracy-building institutions in post-conflict nations).
S.C. Res. 1542, T 7(II)(a), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1542 (Apr. 30, 2004).
24.
The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on an Agenda for
25.
Democratisation,T 17, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/51/761 (Dec. 20,
1996).
See generally DANESH SAROOSHI, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
26.
DEVELOPMENT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY: THE DELEGATION BY THE UN SECURITY
COUNCIL OF ITS CHAPTER VII POWERS (1999) (discussing the parameters of delegation
of the Security Council's powers).
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III. AUTHORITY, TITLE, AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN
POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

The questions of which actor is responsible for the reconstruction
of states or territories and from which norm the legal authority and
title originates are matters currently regulated by general
State
international law and the law of the United Nations.
sovereignty, from which a state derives the exclusive right to exercise
competences on its territory, must in any case be seen as the starting
point of any debate on authority and title in post-conflict situations.
Under current international law, the authority to engage in
First, the only
comprehensive post-conflict reforms is limited.
or
peace-building
comprehensive
a
impose
can
that
institution
territory
or
state
foreign
a
on
mission
administration
international
without the consent of the host state is the Security Council, since
27
Second, in the event of
such a power has been delegated to it.
do not convey any
conflict
armed
of
laws
the
foreign occupation,
other
occupier-administrator
the
to
responsibilities
comprehensive
of
laws
the
for
which
administration
than the mere usufructuary-type
occupation provide.

A. Sovereignty, the Security Council, and ForeignAdministration
Sovereignty is closely related to international legal personality
and can be described as the right to exercise, to the exclusion of any
The relation between
other state, the functions of a state. 28
sovereignty and the exercise of administrative functions by
29
international actors has often been misconceived in recent cases.
Sovereignty is distinct from the competences of the state and distinct

U.N. Charter art. 39.
27.
Cf. Island of Palmas (Neth. v. U.S.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 22 AM. J.
28.
INT'L L. 867, 875 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928) ("Sovereignty in the relation between states
signifies independence. Independence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to
exercise therein, the exclusion of any other state, the functions of the state.").
With regard to Iraq, the concept of sovereignty has frequently been used
29.
and misused by the CPA and the Security Council. In one of its resolutions, the
Security Council "reaffirm(ed) the independence, sovereignty, unity, and territorial
integrity of Iraq," although it also stated at the end of occupation that "Iraq will
reassert its full sovereignty." S.C. Res. 1546, pmbl., 1 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1546 (June 8,
2004). However, sovereignty as such was never transferred to the CPA, as the CPA was
merely the administering authority in Iraq. As noted by Brownlie, "the important
features of 'sovereignty' in such cases are the continued existence of a legal personality
and the attribution of territory to that legal person and not to the holders for the time
being." IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (6th ed. 2003).

In such cases, a reference to the transfer of authority instead of sovereignty would
therefore have been more appropriate. See also A. Roberts, The End of Occupation:Iraq
2004, 54 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 27, 41 (2005) (noting that few states today exercise
sovereignty in its purest form due to the growing body of international law).

2010/

RESPONSIBILITY FOR POST-CONFLICT REFORMS

127

from its administration.3 0 Certain situations-one of them being the
transfer of administrative powers--can moderate a state's exclusive
competence. A state's transmission of parts of its administrative
power and competences to another entity should be understood as the
exercise of the rights of a sovereign state. As the Permanent Court of
International Justice noted in the well-known Wimbledon case: "[Tihe
right of entering into international engagements is an attribute of
State sovereignty."3 1 The delegation of certain competences to other
actors can be accomplished either by consenting to the deployment of
a mission that is granted certain administrative functions or by
granting the power to the United Nations Security Council to
establish such a mission under the terms of the United Nations
Charter.
Despite some contentions to the contrary, 32 there are clear bases
for the legal authority to exercise administrative functions in postWhen the Security Council authorizes
conflict situations.
comprehensive peace-building efforts, such efforts can, without doubt,
be seen in conformity with United Nations institutional law,
especially when viewed in the context of the Security Council's
33
competences under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
When created by the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the

BROWNLIE, supra note 29, at 107; J. CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES
30.
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 33 (2d ed. 2006).

31.

S.S. Wimbledon (Gr. Brit. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, at 25 (Aug.

17).
32.
See e.g., Hollin K. Dickerson, Assumptions of Legitimacy and the
Foundations of InternationalTerritorialAdministration, 100 AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
144, 145 (2006) (questioning the legal authority of the United Nations to carry out
international administration of post-conflict nations).
Ruffert, supra note 14, at 620-21; see also Nico Schrijver, Lecture
33.
Commentary, The Complex Role of the Legal Adviser When InternationalOrganizations
Administer Territory by R. Wilde, 95 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 259 (2001) (noting that
the Security Council's authority to provide administration is arguably an implied
power under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter). For a discussion on the
establishment of UNMIK and the authorization of KFOR, see Behrami v. France, App.
No. 71412/01, & Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, App. No. 78166/01, 45 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 85, 130 (2007).
While the Resolution referred to Chapter VII of the Charter, it did not identify
the precise Articles of that Chapter under which the UNSC was acting and the
Court notes that there are a number of possible bases in Chapter VII for this
delegation by the UNSC: the non-exhaustive Article 42 (read in conjunction
with the widely formulated Article 48), the non-exhaustive nature of Article 41
under which territorial administrations could be authorised as a necessary
instrument for sustainable peace; or implied powers under the Charter for the
UNSC to so act in both respects based on an effective interpretation of the
Charter. In any event, the Court considers that Chapter VII provided a
framework for the above-described delegation of the UNSC's security powers to
KFOR and of its civil administration powers to UNMIK.
Id.
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United Nations Charter, peace-building missions and international
administrations must be seen as a method to maintain international
peace and security, the primary responsibility of the Security Council.
There is no reason to differentiate between the Security Council's
power to organize the reconstruction of a state following a military
intervention and its power to do so based on humanitarian grounds,
since practice shows that peacekeeping and peace-building activities
are not necessarily linked to the prior authorization to use force. 34
Despite some reluctance in legal literature to accept the expanding
role of the Security Council and range of measures the Security
Council adopts under its Chapter VII powers,3 5 recent comprehensive
peace-building mandates have not encountered objections by United
Nations member states. 36
The consent of the host state is not absolutely necessary when
the Security Council acts under Chapter VII.
However, when
possible, the consent of the host state is often sought and obtained for
intrusive reconstruction activities3 7 since, from a practical
perspective, international administrations cannot adequately operate
without the consent of the sovereign state. This seems to have been
the reason Indonesia's consent was sought for UNTAET, despite the

34.
See ERIC
DE BRABANDERE,
POST-CONFLICT ADMINISTRATIONS
IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: INTERNATIONAL TERRITORIAL ADMINISTRATION, TRANSITIONAL
AUTHORITY AND FOREIGN OCCUPATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 15-34 (2009)

(providing a historical survey of the United Nation's use of administrative power after
military intervention or humanitarian assistance); see also B.S. Brown, Intervention,
Self-Determination, Democracy and the Residual Responsibilities of the Occupying
Power in Iraq, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 23, 71 (2004-2005) (noting that only
the Security Council "can bring together the credibility, expertise, and Chapter VII
authority, all of which are necessary to wrap together and reconcile the various
interests and obligations concerned into a politically palatable, and therefore at least
potentially workable, package").
35.
For a critical overview, see BENEDETTO CONFORTI, THE LAW AND PRACTICE
OF THE UNITED NATIONS 205-06 (3d rev. ed. 2005).

36.
E. de Wet, Beginning an End of Occupation-UNSecurity Council's Impact
on the Laws of Occupation, 34 COLLEGIUM (SPECIAL ISSUE) 34, 37 (2006) (noting that
the international community has accepted such mandates, either through explicit
support in the General Assembly, or indirectly by the acceptance of the expenses for
such missions as expenses of the organization). De Wet nevertheless notes the absence
of implicit or explicit approval by the International Community of the mandate granted
to the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. Id. However, notwithstanding
clear controversies as to the legality of the use of force, there was near unanimity about
the need to have a genuine reconstruction process. Cf U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4791st
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4791 (July 22, 2003) (recording statements made after the
adoption of Security Council Resolution 1441).
37.
In the case of Kosovo, the plan presented by Martti Ahtisaari and Victor
Chernomyrdin, which contained the general principles of an agreement on the Kosovo
crisis, was accepted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Agreement on the
Principles (Peace Plan) to Move Towards a Resolution of the Kosovo Crisis, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/649 (June 3, 1999). See also S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 15, at pmbl. (containing
the same principles).
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very doubtful character of Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor.38
East Timor was still formally a non-self-governing territory as of the
1999 popular consultation that led to the establishment of an
international administration. According to the principles applicable
to non-self-governing territories,9 one could assume that Portugal
retained formal sovereignty over East Timor. Therefore, Portugal
and Indonesia entered an agreement to organize the referendum and
the international administration in the event of a vote in favor of
independence. 4 0 In cases where the consent of the state cannot be
obtained, the lack of consent of the host state is often advanced as the
reason why such intrusive operations lack legitimacy. 4 1 In such
cases, one need rely solely on the powers given to the United
Nations-particularly those with respect to threats to or breaches of
international peace and security.

B. Belligerent Occupationand the Occupiers'Limited Authority
In the case of foreign military occupation not based on the
consent of the host state, the question of title seems more complex,
but this complexity is only a false impression. The application of the
laws of occupation is based on a factual situation, namely the
belligerent occupation of a territory by a foreign army. The rationale
behind regulating such a situation is that the resort to force and the
subsequent occupation of foreign territory cannot lead to the
annexation of territory, extensive reforms, or the exercise of
transformative powers by the occupying forces. Both the Hague
RegulationS42 and the Fourth Geneva Convention 43 adopt the
principle that occupation of territory does not result in the transfer of
sovereignty. The occupied state's exercise of state competences is

38.
East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90, T 37 (June 30); see also S. R.
Ratner, Foreign Occupation and International Territorial Administration: The
Challenges of Convergence, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L. 695, 697 n.6 (2005) (noting that
Indonesia was not "clearly the lawful sovereign" over East Timor).
39.
CRAWFORD, supranote 30, at 614.
40.
Agreement on the Question of East Timor, Indon.-Port., May 5, 1999, 2062
U.N.T.S. 7.
41.
See, e.g., Dickerson, supra note 32, at 145 ("In place of host-state consent in
those situations, there is instead Security Council authorization, which raises the
problems that are inherent in the structure and decisionmaking processes of the
Security Council.").
42.
Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2277, 187 Consol. T.S. 227 [hereinafter Hague Regulations]. The rules
concerning occupation are contained in articles 42 to 56 of the Hague Regulations of

1907.
43.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War arts. 27-34, 47-78, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Fourth Geneva Convention].
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merely "suspended,"4 4 but, as noted above, issues of sovereignty and
exclusive state competence are often misconceived.
The legal title to the administration of the hostile state is subject
to several exceptions limited to maintaining the state's internal
structures as they exist. The rights and obligations of the occupiers
are restricted in the sense that the laws of occupation are centered on
the maintenance of a status quo in the occupied territory. The Hague
Regulations stipulate that the occupier must be regarded as
"administrator and usufructuary of public buildings, real estate,
forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile State, and
situated in the occupied country. It must safeguard the capital of
these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of
usufruct."45 With regard to the existing legal system of the occupied
territory, the Hague Regulations establish the principle of continuity
of the legal system of the occupied territory, unless absolutely
prevented. 46 Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention specifies an
analogous obligation concerning penal laws.
Obviously, the laws of occupation are an inadequate framework
for peace-building exercises, particularly in light of the limited
administrative powers. The laws applicable to foreign occupation
were clearly not designed for such activities and are thus an
insufficient and inadequate source of authority to address the postconflict reconstruction of states. 47 By the same token, the very reason
the laws of occupation are inadequate to deal with comprehensive
rigid
focus
on
reconstruction
missions-their
post-conflict
the
reason
for
their
status
quo-is
precisely
maintaining the
existence, namely to limit the occupier's powers in a territory for
which the occupier has no title. For these particular reasons, the

See ROBERT KOLB, IUS IN BELLO: LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DES CONFLITS
44.
ARMtS 191 (2003); UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT 283-84, § 11.25 (2004).

45.
Hague Regulations, supra note 42, art. 55.
46.
Id. art. 43. On the limited legislative powers of the occupying forces, see
Marco Sassoli, Legislation and Maintenance of Public Order and Civil Life by
Occupying Powers, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.661, 664 (2005).
47.
On the purpose of the laws of occupation see generally EYAL BENVENISTI,
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 3-31 (1993); Hans-Peter Gasser, Protection
of the Civilian Population,in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAw

237, 270 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2008); Adam Roberts, What is a Military Occupation?, 55
BRIT Y.B. INT'L L. 249, 295 (1984). On the inadequacy of the laws of occupation to the
United States' occupation of Iraq, see Ash 0. BAli, Justice Under Occupation: Rule of
Law and the Ethics of Nation-Building in Iraq, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 431 (2005); Gregory
H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 195 (2004); Kaiyan H. Kaikobad,
Problems of Belligerent Occupation: The Scope of Powers Exercised by the Coalition
ProvisionalAuthority in Iraq, April/May 2003-June 2004, 54 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 253
(2005); Conor McCarthy, The Paradoxof the InternationalLaw of Military Occupation:
Sovereignty and the Reformation of Iraq, 10 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 43 (2005);
David J. Scheffer, Beyond Occupation Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 842, 847-53 (2003).
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laws of occupation and, especially, the limited character of the
occupiers' authority must be maintained.
If the Security Council expands the powers of the occupier, the
authority is transformed, and one must then refer to the previous
paragraphs on the authority and legal bases for the Security Council
to authorize the creation of administrative missions.4 8 Since the laws
of occupation cannot be seen as norms of jus cogens, states are free to
modify them or accept changes to them; similarly, the Security
Council can decide to expand the authority and mandate of the
occupying force. 49 In Iraq, for instance, Security Council Resolution
1483 contained the basic provisions for the administration of the
territory and clarified the different responsibilities in Iraq.5 0
Resolution 1483 confirmed that the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), as the occupying power, had the primary responsibility in the
administration of Iraq. The Security Council called on the CPA to
fulfill its obligations under the Hague Regulations and the Geneva
Conventions.5 1 At the same time, the Security Council considerably
expanded the CPA's mandate by calling on the occupying powers to
promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective
administration of the territory. Despite claims that the relevant
paragraphs of Resolution 1483 were not precise enough to supplant
the rules relating to foreign occupation, 52 the wording of Resolution
1483 left no doubt as to the extension or modification of the CPA's
powers.53 Indeed, one cannot ignore that the mandate to "promote
the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of
the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration
of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in

On the emerging concept of "transformative occupations" see Adam
48.
Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation: Applying the Laws of War and Human
On the relation between international
Rights, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 580 (2006).
administrations and the laws of occupation see also Ratner, supra note 38.
49.
However, for the claim that a Security Council resolution cannot derogate
from the laws of armed conflict, see Luigi Condorelli, Le statut des Forces des Nations
Unies et le droit international humanitaire [The Status of the United Nations Forces
and International Humanitarian Law], in LES CASQUES BLEUS: POLICIERS OU
COMBATTANTS? [BLUE HELMETS: POLICEMEN OR COMBATANTS?] 87, 105-06 (Claude
Emanuelli ed., 1997); cf. ERIC DAVID, PRINCIPES DE DROIT DES CONFLITS ARMES (1994).

1-23, U.N. Doc S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).
S.C. Res. 1483,
50.
Id. 5.
51.
See e.g., Robert Kolb, Occupation in Iraq since 2003 and the Powers of the
52.
UN Security Council, 90 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 29, 48 (2008) (stating that the language
of the relevant provisions is vague and imprecise).
See Rudiger Wolfrum, Iraq-From Belligerent Occupation to Iraqi Exercise
53.
of Sovereignty: Foreign Power Versus International Community Interference, 9 MAX
PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 1, 16-17 (2005) (stating that the mandate in Security Council
Resolution 1483 "goes beyond the powers assigned to a belligerent occupant under
international humanitarian law, in general").
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which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future"
goes well beyond the general powers of an occupying force. 54
The title to engage in post-conflict reconstruction is thus
restricted to two specific cases. Under customary law relating to the
occupation of foreign territory, generally after an armed conflict, the
occupier-administrator
cannot
derive
any
comprehensive
responsibilities other than the usufructuary administration. The
Security Council is the only institution, besides the host state, that
can either expand the occupier's administrative and transformative
powers or decide to establish such a mission independently from
either the existence of a conflict or the formal application of the laws
of occupation. Jus post bellum theories that transpose such a
responsibility to other actors, such as the intervening state(s), fall
short for several reasons. Most importantly, jus post bellum fails to
convincingly explain why intervening actors should5 5 bear a
responsibility for the "post" phase or why the normative framework
containing post-conflict obligations needs to be remodelled.

IV. A CHALLENGE TO JUS POSTBELLUMAS A LEGAL CONCEPT

In contemporary research, jus post bellum is used in several
ways in numerous disciplines. This is also the reason why it is
difficult to grasp such a notion, let alone to use it as an emerging
legal concept. On the whole, modern analyses of jus post bellum can
be grouped into two different clusters. The first category of jus post
bellum theories focuses on the legal holder of obligations in the postconflict phase. Departing from well-established rules relating to the
consent of states, the rights and obligations of foreign occupying
powers, and the authority of the Security Council in respect of threats
to international peace and security, the first type of jus post bellum
theories focuses on the inherent link between post-conflict obligations
and the use of force and aims at a redistribution of the obligations of
states and international organizations towards the states or territory
in which the reconstruction process takes place. 56
States and

54.
See, however, the discussion by Robert Kolb on the question whether the
Resolution was precise enough to include an explicit derogation from the laws of armed
conflict. Robert Kolb, supra note 52, at 38-48. For an overview of the relation between
the powers of the occupying forces under the laws of occupation and the Security
Council see Fox, supra note 47, at 255-62.
55.
Several authors indeed argue that "just" occupiers not only have the right
to engage in comprehensive post-war reforms, but that they have a (moral) obligation
to do so. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 122-23 (1977); Orend, Jus
Post Bellum, supra note 4, at 122-23.
56.
See e.g., Louis V. lasiello, Jus Post Bellum: The Moral Responsibilities of
Victors in War, 57 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 33, 40-44 (2004) ("[T]hey may help a former
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international organizations that have actively participated in the jus
ad bellum stage of a conflict could thus be endowed with special
compulsory responsibilities in the post-conflict scenario. In a sense,
such arguments tie rules related to which actor should be involved in
post-conflict reconstruction to rules related to what is allowed in postconflict reconstruction.5 7
The preceding debate on the authority and title in post-conflict
reconstruction is difficult to completely detach from the content of
such responsibilities, namely the legal delimitation of the rights and
obligations of actors involved in post-conflict situations. The legal
limits to the exercise of powers by occupying forces and other actors
have been subject to scholarly debate since the existence of
international administrations5 8 and occupation,59 but they have
thrived since the re-use of international administrations in postconflict environments. This recent re-focus on the obligations of
foreign actors in such situations has lead equally to a proposition to
group such rules and norms under the umbrella of jus post bellum.
This second, more impartial category understands jus post bellum as
a legal framework applicable in the transition from war to peace.
Thus, jus post bellum would be a corpus of legal rules and principles
as a complement to jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 60 The contents of
that legal framework would include not only positive obligations such
as the holding of trials to try serious crimes committed by former
regimes but also rules pertaining to the conduct in the post-conflict
reconstruction process of states that have participated in the armed
conflict or of international organizations involved in the post-conflict
phase-rules relating to the way in which the authority and the
mandate should be exercised. 6 1
The reconstruction of states or territories emerging from conflict
should be distinguished clearly from the nature and legality of the

enemy move beyond the devastation of the present to eventual healing and success post
bellum.").
57.
See e.g., Orend, Just-War Theorist, supra note 4, at 578 (arguing that "if an
aggressor wins the war, the peace terms will necessarily be unjust").
58.
See generally JACQUES LEPRETTE, LE STATUT INTERNATIONAL DE TRIESTE
(1949); MtIR YDIT, INTERNATIONALISED TERRITORIES: FROM THE "FREE CITY OF
CRACOW" TO THE "FREE CITY OF BERLIN" (1961) (discussing the state competences in
the Free Territory of Trieste following World War II); J.H.W. VERZIJL, II
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1969) (discussing the concept of
sovereign states as international persons).
59.
See, for example, the discussions of Virally regarding the Allied powers
during the occupation of Germany after the Second World War M. VIRALLY,
L'ADMINISTRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L'ALLEMAGNE DU 8 MAI 1945 AU 24 AVRIL 1947
11-23 (1948).
60.
For such an approach, see Stahn, supra note 2, at 936-37.
Kristen Boon, Note, Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones: Jus Post
61.
Bellum and the Contemporary Occupant's Law-Making Powers, 50 MCGILL L. J. 285,
293-95 (2005).
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armed conflict.
Post-conflict peace building and reconstruction
requires a neutral and legal approach. Moreover, recent practice has
shown that military intervention does not necessarily imply postconflict responsibility. Some military interventions are justified from
a legal perspective as a method of self-defense, making the link with
the post-intervention scenario not only problematic but also
incomprehensible. The defended link between the "pre" and the
"post" stages of a conflict leads to an unwarranted revival of a "just
war"-type assessment of military interventions. 62 There is no need
for a "new" distinct legal framework to address post-conflict
reconstruction or the transition from law to peace. Besides relying on
the fact that positive international law does not support such
theories, there is no normative gap in the law of transition from war
to peace-recent cases have shown that there already exists an
adequate, flexible, and neutral legal framework to address such
situations. 63

A. Linking the Legality of the Use of Force and
(Post-Conflict)Peace-Building
Transferring rights and obligations to intervening states and
establishing a link between forcible intervention and post-conflict
responsibilities are problematic for two reasons. First, peace building
and post-conflict reconstruction are concepts that emerged
independently from the legality of the use of armed force, and this
independence is clearly traceable from recent practice. 64 The clear
distinction between post bellum responsibility and the use of force
should be maintained. Indeed, the only cases in which the use of
force can be justified in function of the outcome of the conflict is when
the use of force is precisely aimed at obtaining changes after the
conflict. Jus post bellum advocates often neglect to mention that such
situations are not recognized by customary international law, limiting
the 'just' causes of war to self-defense and collective security as
In these two cases, the
authorized by the Security Council.
connection with the post-conflict result is difficult to accept for
several reasons.6 5

62.
63.
64.
65.

See
See
See
See

infra Part IV.A.
infra Part IV.B.
infra Part IVA.
infra Part IV.B.
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The Independence of Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Notwithstanding the possibility of having a moral obligation to
engage in reconstruction after the armed conflict, 66 the lex lata does
not permit any transposition of post-conflict responsibilities to an
intervening state. Additionally, there is neither a reason to fashion
incentives for states not to wage war as a set of additional obligations
in the post-conflict phase nor a single legal rule that allows the
measurement of the "acceptability of an intervention . . . by its effects

and implications after the use of armed force." 67 The reasons that
states can resort to force are clearly established in international law
and are clearly independent of the post-conflict phase. Post-conflict
peace building is a phenomenon that emerged outside the formal use
of armed force-in situations other than post-international armed
conflict-an often overlooked but highly relevant reality. Despite the
fact that the notion makes an inevitable reference to situations after
a conflict, Part II illustrated that the United Nations' involvement in
post-conflict scenarios is part of a broader evolution in addressing the
causes of a conflict, which might be purely internal. This evolution
fits into the focus on the creation of democratic and stable institutions
as a proactive and reactive instrument to maintain peace and
security. It does not, therefore, necessarily follow an international
armed conflict or imply the intervention of a third party.
When comprehensive post-conflict missions are set up after the
use of armed force that is not authorized by the Security Council and
has no clear legal justification-as in Kosovo or Iraq-the authority
to engage in post-conflict reconstruction is based on the consent of the
host state, the Security Council's power in this respect, or both. The
relevant Security Council resolutions are drafted very carefully to
avoid the possibility that the post-conflict mandates are interpreted
as ex post facto validation of the unauthorized use of force. 68 Security
Council Resolution 1244 established the United Nations international
administration in Kosovo and cannot be interpreted as a validation of
the use of armed force. The fact that the United Nations was almost
unanimous regarding the post-conflict phase cannot overshadow the
division of Security Council members on the legality of the use of

Outi Korhonen, "Post"As Justification:InternationalLaw and Democracy66.
Building after Iraq, 4 GERMAN L.J. 709, 710 (2003); see generally Brian Orend, Justice
After War, 16 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 43 (2002) (offering guidelines for the conduct of
victors after a war); Louis V. Iasiello, supra note 56 (same).
Stahn, supra note 2, at 931, 943.
67.
See, however, Inger Osterdahl, Preach What You Practice. The Security
68.
Council and the Legalisation Ex Post Facto of the Unilateral Use of Force, 74 NORDIC J.
INT'L L. 231, 238 (2005).
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armed force.69 The situation, to a certain extent, is very similar to
the situation in Iraq.70 The fact that such missions are set up
notwithstanding the questionable legality of the use of armed force is
clear evidence of the "neutrality" of post-conflict peace-building
towards the issue of the use of force. In the case of Afghanistan,
despite some criticism in legal literature, the international
community accepted the right of the United States to act in selfdefense.71 Notwithstanding a different division of responsibilities
between the actors involved in the reconstruction, the post-conflict
mandate and process in Afghanistan was very similar to other cases
in which the use of force was more controversial, such as Kosovo and
Iraq. Moreover, actors operating in the post-conflict situation are not
necessarily the same as those who resorted to the use of force. Post
bellum activities in Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq
provide sufficient support for this. In Kosovo, for example, the
military operation was launched by NATO member states while other
international organizations-including the United Nations, even
though it was explicitly bypassed in the ad bellum stage-handled
the civil reconstruction process. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the United
States carried out the principal military intervention, but the

69.
For more on the legality of the unilateral military intervention in Kosovo,
see generally Martha Brenfors & Malene M. Petersen, The Legality of Unilateral
Humanitarian Intervention-A Defense, 69 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 449 (2000); Antonio
Cassese, Ex Iniuria Jus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards InternationalLegitimization
of Forcible HumanitarianCountermeasuresin the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 23 (1999); Richard A. Falk, Kosovo, World Order, and the Future of International
Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 847 (1999); Thomas Franck, Lessons of Kosovo, 93 AM. J. INT'L
L. 857 (1999); Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of "HumanitarianIntervention," 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999); Daniel H. Joyner, The Kosovo Intervention: Legal Analysis
and a More Persuasive Paradigm, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L.597 (2002); Nico Krisch, Morality
and the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention after Kosovo, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 323
(2002); W. M. Reisman, Kosovo's Antinomies, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 860 (1999); Abraham D.
Sofaer, International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (2000); Ralph Zacklin,
Beyond Kosovo: The United Nations and HumanitarianIntervention, 41 VA. J. INT'L L.
923 (2001).
70.
See U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4791st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4791 (July 22,
2003) (describing the situation in Iraq); see also David Wippman, Sharing Power in
Iraq, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 29 (2004) (same). For more on the question of the legality of
the use of force in the case of Iraq, see Jutta Brunn6e & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of
Force: International Law after Iraq, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 785 (2004); Thomas M.
Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607
(2003).
71.
S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1368, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). On the 'lawfulness' of the use of self-defense against
non-state actors see Thomas Franck, Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 839, 839-40 (2001); Mary E. O'Connell, Lawful Self-Defense to Terrorism, 63
U. PA. L. REV. 889, 892 (2002); Jordan Paust, Use of Armed Force Against Terrorists in
Afghanistan, Iraq and Beyond, 35 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 533, 533-35 (2002); Kimberley
N. Trapp, Back to Basics: Necessity, Proportionality,and the Right of Self-Defence
Against Non-State TerroristActors, 56 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 141, 151 (2007).
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reconstruction process equally involved other actors such as the
United Nations and NATO.
The independence of post bellum should be maintained. Under
the existing exceptions to the prohibition on the use of force, the
advocated connection of post-conflict responsibilities is problematic.
It is interesting to note that the potential positive outcome of postconflict effects is used often as a justification for the resort to force
when there is no general acceptance of the intervention's legality,
especially when dealing with either "humanitarian" or "prodemocratic" interventions.7 2 In such cases, the positive outcome of
the reconstruction process is often used to legalize ex post facto a
controversial use of force.
If we disregard the fact that a
humanitarian justification for interventions is not a legally accepted
motive for the use of force, the post bellum outcome clearly would
justify the use of force in such cases, since the use of force is precisely
aimed at obtaining changes after the conflict.
Such theories,
however, amount to reintroducing notions of "just" war as a new but
unwarranted exception to the prohibition on the use of force.
2.

Jus Post Bellum and "Just Wars"

Under current international law, the laws relating to armed
force are separated into the legality of the use of armed force (jus ad
bellum) and the law applicable during an armed conflict (jus in bello),
including the laws relating to the occupation of territory by a foreign
presence.73 These two areas of international law are rightly not
connected in the sense that the state's violation of its obligations
under one system does not, by itself, amount to a violation of the laws
of the other. 74 Similarly, the application of the jus in bello does not
depend on the legality of the military intervention. Adding a third
branch to the dualistic regulation of the use of armed force is not
problematic per se, but such theories imply that the outcome or result
of an armed conflict cannot be detached from the very reasons or
legality of the resort to force.7 5 The need for jus post bellum to fill a
"systemic gap," as suggested by Stahn, 76 is very similar.

72.
On the claim that 'transformative occupations' should be accepted in
"exceptional circumstances," such as genocide and ethnic cleansing, which besides
warranting a military intervention would equally 'justify' subsequent post-conflict
transformations see Hamada Zahawi, Redefining the Laws of Occupation in the Wake
of Operation Iraqi "Freedom,"95 CAL. L. REV. 2295, 2335-37 (2007).
73.
See, e.g., Stahn, supra note 2, at 924-26 (discussing this "dualist
conception of armed force").
74.
Id. at 925.
See, in particular, Oren, Just-War Theorist, supra note 4, at 575-77
75.
(arguing why jus post bellum should be part of the just-war theory).
Carsten Stahn, Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s), 23 AM. U. INT'L
76.
L. REV. 311, 328 (2008).
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Before the recent re-emergence of jus post bellum, just war
theorists and political philosophers such as Saint Augustine, Saint
Isidore of Seville, Saint Thomas Aquinas, Francisco de Vitoria,
Francisco Suarez, Alberico Gentili, Hugo Grotius, and Immanuel
Kant included a "just" post-war arrangement in their conception of a
"just war" as a necessary corollary of the just cause of the war.77
Grotius, for instance, in his discussion of The Law of War and Peace,
addressed the jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues and added several
legal rules pertaining to the period after war, such as how to treat
enemy property.7 8 The rules set out by Grotius result from the just
cause of the war, which was, according to Grotius, the only valid
source for the rules on the conduct of war and after the war.7 9 In the
eighteenth century, Kant similarly argued that the rights of the
victor were different according to whether the vanquished was either
a "just" or an "unjust" enemy.8 0 Kant was one of the first to establish
a complete three-tiered framework for war:
The Right of Nations in relation to the State of War may be divided
into: 1. The Right of going to War; 2. Right during War; and 3. Right
after War, the object of which is to constrain the nations mutually to
pass from this state of war, and to found a common Constitution
81
establishing Perpetual Peace.

Furthering the continuous peace was the underlying reason for this
theory because it was viewed as a continuation of the right to resort
to force, which was seen as lawful if aimed at establishing this
eternal peace.82 The recent re-emergence of the jus post bellum also
has principally been the work of a new generation of just war
theorists such as Orend, who notes that
the raw fact of victory does not of itself confer rights upon the victor,
nor duties upon the vanquished. Might does not equal right. It is only
when the victorious regime has fought a just war that we can
meaningfully speak of rights and duties of victor and vanquished at the
conclusion of armed conflict. 8 3

77.
For an overview, see WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 105-18, 201-28 (Michael Byers trans., 2000). See also M. COGEN, THE
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 56-57, 150-55 (2008).
78.
HUGo GROTIUs, DE JURE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES, reprinted in II THE
CLASSICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 757-60 (James B. Scott ed., Francis W. Kelly trans.,
Clarendon Press 1925) (1646).
79.
Id. at 599-601.
80.
IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN EXPOSITION OF THE
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF JURISPRUDENCE AS THE SCIENCE OF RIGHT 223-24
(William Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley 1974) (1887).
81.
Id. at 214.
82.
Id. at 222. For a very similar but more recent theory see Louis V. Iasiello,
supra note 56.
83.
Orend, Jus Post Bellum, supra note 4, at 122.

2010/

RESPONSIBILITY FOR POST-CONFLICTREFORMS

139

This intrinsic8 4 link with the justness of an armed conflict is the
inherent flaw of this conception of jus post bellum. In a time when
international law is moving from a jus ad bellum to a jus contra
bellum approach,8 5 it seems even more imprudent to assess the
legality of an armed conflict by its effects or to grant certain postconflict responsibilities and rights to states based on the "justness" of
their cause.
When the use of force is in conformity with international law, jus
post bellum theories fail to explain why states and organizations
involved in the conflict should, or can, bear responsibility for postconflict reconstruction, especially when the use of force is justified for
reasons such as self-defense. 86 When a state has resorted to the use
of force in self-defense, it would indeed be illogical to impose upon the
defending state certain obligations towards the state that triggered
the exercise of the right of self-defense. 7 The use of force in an
exercise of the inherent right to self-defense can only be aimed at
exercising that right. One could, however, consider that the state
that acts in self-defense might go further to remove the threat of the
armed attack that triggered the application of the right to selfdefense. Originally, self-defense was an action against an armed
attack that had to fulfill several criteria, including the principle of
proportionality.88 Self-defense is an exception to the use of force and
not necessarily concerned with comprehensive reforms after the use
of force. The lawfulness of the act of self-defense, particularly its
compliance with the requirements of necessity and proportionally,
needs to be evaluated by the extent to which the use of armed force is
The Special
necessary to halt or repel the armed attack.89
Rapporteur of the International Law Commission on the
Responsibility of States noted that self-defense does not "preclude the
wrongfulness of conduct in all cases or with respect to all

84.
See, for example, Stahn arguing that 'jus post bellum is to some extent
inherent in the conception of jus ad bellum." Stahn, supra note 76, at 328.
See, e.g., OLIVIER CORTEN, LE DROIT CONTRE LA GUERRE: LINTERDICTION DU
85.
RECOURS A LA FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL CONTEMPORAIN (2008).

86.

Alex J. Bellamy, The Responsibilities of Victory: Jus Post Bellum and the

Just War, 34 REV. INT'L STUD. 601, 602 (2008).

See id. (discussing problems with the maximalist approach to governance
87.
and reconstruction).
For a description of the principle of proportionality and an application to a
88.
recent conflict, see Michael Bonafede, Note, Here, There and Everywhere: Assessing the
ProportionalityDoctrine and U.S. Use of Force in Response to Terrorism After The
September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155 (2002).
For an example of adjudication on the use of proportionality and self89.
defense, see Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 161, 198 (Nov. 6). See also N.
Ochoa-Ruiz & E. Salamanca-Aguado, Exploring the Limits of International Law
Relating to the Use of Force in Self-Defence, 16 EUR. J. OF INT'L L. 499, 517 (2005)
(analyzing the court's decision in Oil Platforms).
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obligations."90 Such a stretch of the right of self-defense, thus, can be
acceptable under current international law, provided that it remains
limited to the function of self-defense. An excessive extension of the
right of self-defense, however, is dangerous in practice because the
causality between the armed attack and its cause is often difficult to
establish or may be controversial. Similarly, an expansion of the
right to self-defense in that respect would open the door for abuses of
the right to achieve post-conflict reforms, bringing such suggestions
close to just war theories.
The only time a close link between jus ad bellum and jus in bello
can be defended without resorting to the justification based on
potential positive results is when the Security Council has authorized
the use of force on humanitarian or related grounds.9 1 In that limited
case, however, the post-conflict activity should not necessarily be
directly linked to the use of force. Practice has shown that the
Security Council's activity in this field is independent from any
inquiry into the legality of the use of force. However, one might
assume that when the Security Council authorizes the use of force on
humanitarian or related grounds, there would be no reason to
postpone internal reforms in the state in question to eradicate the
threat that caused the use of force. In fact, there is a tendency to
point to the Security Council's responsibility to address such postconflict situations.
The International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty (ICISS) made one of the first attempts to institutionalize
the "post" phase of a conflict.
This attempt resulted in the
"responsibility to rebuild," which, when taken together with the
"responsibility to prevent" and the "responsibility to react," forms a
part of the more widely-known "responsibility to protect."9 2 The
Commission's idea of a "responsibility to rebuild" would include a
responsibility for the international community, when it is intervening
as part of its responsibility to protect, to subsequently address postconflict reconstruction.
To date, however, the responsibility to
rebuild paradigm has neither obtained support from practice nor
gathered unanimous political adherence as an emerging legal norm.9 3
In addition, even in such a theoretically coherent tripartite
conception
of responsibility
and
sovereignty,
post-conflict

90.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the InternationalLaw Commission, Art. 21(3),
U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10, 2001).
91.
U.N. Charter art. 42.
92.
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY,
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 11, 19, 29, 39 (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/

pdf/Commission-Report.pdf.
93.
See, e.g., Carsten Stahn, Notes and Comments, Responsibility to Protect:
Political Rhetoric or Emerging Legal Norm, 101 AM. J. INT'L L. 99, 110 (2007)
(describing a lack of support by the international community for the concept of the
responsibility to rebuild at the 2005 World Summit).
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responsibilities are limited to cases where the responsibility to
prevent has failed and where the international community-via the
Security Council-decided to react. 94 In addition, a more in-depth
examination of the notion of the responsibility to rebuild reveals that
it is in fact more reasonable to have adequate exit-strategies than to
add responsibilities to the victorious states. The need to have an
adequate exit-strategy is certainly beyond doubt, but such a
requirement addresses the conditions under which peace-building
missions may scale down, not to the conditions under which the
military intervention can come to an end. Such conditions are thus
independent from the use of force and relate more to the legal
framework of post-conflict reconstruction than to who bears the
responsibility for post-conflict reconstruction.
B. The Legal Framework of Post-conflict Reconstruction:
Jus Post Bellum as "Law after Conflict"
The idea of jus post bellum as a legal framework to address postconflict peace building is thus seen as a normative rather than a
systemic notion that encapsulates the laws or rules applicable in the
transitory phase from conflict to peace. This category of legal rules,
together with jus ad bellum and jus in bello, would be the third of
three distinct and independent frameworks applicable to armed
conflicts. 95 Jus post bellum then needs to be seen as an objective set
of rules, applicable irrespective of the legality or illegality of the use
of force, similar to the separation of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. 96
The advantage of such an approach to jus post bellum, in sharp
contrast to the previous scheme, is that it is "decoupled from the
historical understanding which associated fairness with the idea of
justice in favour of the party which had fought a just and lawful
war."9 7 This normative gap in the law of transition from war to peace
refers to both the obligations of states and international
organizations in the post phase and to the limits on the exercise of
these obligations. When jus post bellum is used in this sense, the real
questions are whether the whole legal framework of post-conflict

94.

See

INTERNATIONAL

COMMISSION

ON

INTERVENTION

AND

STATE

SOVEREIGNTY, supranote 92, at 39 (discussing the responsibility to rebuild).
See, e.g., Boon, supra note 61 (surveying recent legal reforms in occupied
95.
territories); Jean L. Cohen, The Role of InternationalLaw in Post Conflict ConstitutionMaking: Toward a Jus Post Bellum for "Interim Occupation," 51 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
497 (2006-2007) (discussing traditional theories of occupation law and the need for a
jus post bellum law of armed conflict); Stahn, supra note 2 (arguing for the need for
rules and principles governing peace-making after conflict and an updated view of the
scope of the historical concert of war).
96.
Boon, supra note 61, at 290-92.
97.
Stahn, supra note 2, at 936.
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interventions can be categorized as a distinct set of legal rules and
whether the use of such new terminology has some added value. 98
1.

Rules, Principles and Restrictions on Peace Settlements

Scholars' opinions on the necessity of creating a new set of rules
and principles differ to some extent, but they all concur that the
differentiation between times of war and times of peace is not only
factually impossible to make but also legally flawed. Neither the
laws of peace, ius pacis, nor the laws of war, lus in bello, contain
principles or a framework suitable for managing the transition or
post-conflict phase.99
To some extent, it is arguable that the
traditional dichotomy between the law applicable in war and the law
applicable in peacetime is losing significance. For example, human
rights, traditionally seen as part of the law applicable in peacetime,
have been considered also applicable (albeit subject to several
exceptions) in wartime.100 It is unclear, however, why the factual
changes in addressing post-conflict zones should bring about a
departure from existing rules in this respect. There are, without
question, certain tendencies regarding post-conflict governance and
administration that can be observed from recent practice. These
include the creation of compensation commissions to manage
reparations, the focus on principles of democratic governance, and the
creation of mechanisms
to determine individual criminal
responsibility for past crimes. However, the reasons behind the
claimed need to couple existing obligations in post-conflict
reconstruction with suggested new rules and principles in a third
category in the transition from war to peace remain vague.

98.
See Gelijin Molier, Rebuilding After Armed Conflict: Towards a Legal
Framework of the Responsibility to Rebuild or a Jus Post Bellum?, in PEACE, SECURITY
AND DEVELOPMENT IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION: THE INTEGRATED SECURITY
APPROACH VIEWED FROM A MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE 317, 317-18 (Gelijin

Molier & Eva Nieuwenhuys eds., 2009) (addresses the question of "whether or not there
is a development into legal principles or a necessity for a legal framework for. . . ." the
concept of ius post bellum).
99.
Stahn, supra note 76, at 322-23.
100.
The International Court of Justice confirmed the disintegration of this
dichotomy in two cases: Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (9 July); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion 1996 I.C.J. 226, 238-40 (8
July). The Human Rights Committee similarly confirmed the complementary and
inclusive character of both legal frameworks in U.N. Human Rights Comm., General
Comment 31: Nature of the General Legal Obligationon States Partiesto the Covenant,
1 11, U.N. Doc. CCPRIC/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004). See also Ratner, supra note
38 (discussing the differences between occupation by states and administration by
international organizations); Ralph Wilde, The Applicability of International Human
Rights Law to the Coalition ProvisionalAuthority (CPA) and Foreign Military Presence
in Iraq, 11 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 489 (2005) (discussing the applicability of
international human rights law in wartime).
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One can be rather brief on the issue of fairness in peace
settlements-often seen as one of the fundamental principles in the
law of transition from war to peace' 0 1- because elements of fairness
are already included in various international legal norms. Generally,
peace agreements are negotiated according to the relevant rules of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which in large parts is
reflective of customary international law.102 There is no need to
depart from existing rules concerning the legal capacity of persons
entitled to negotiate or sign treaties on behalf of the population when
dealing with a transition from war to peace. More specifically, Part
V, Section 2 of the Vienna Convention contains principles on the
invalidity of treaties. 0 3 Recent peace treaties are not simply a means
for the victor to impose its conditions on the vanquished state.
Rather, there is a clear evolution towards settling peace agreements
in an objective manner, with due consideration of the equality of all
parties and international peace and security.104
One issue might nevertheless pose a problem in post-conflict
settings. In such environments, there is not often an authority
capable of binding the state. The Bonn Agreement for instance,
concluded in the aftermath of the U.S. military intervention in
Afghanistan, was signed by non-elected representatives of the
different ethnic groups in Afghanistan. 0 5 These representatives
might be considered to be lacking not only the necessary democratic
legitimacy but also the legal capacity to engage Afghanistan.
However, the Bonn Agreement is not an international treaty, since
the agreement was only signed by Afghan representatives and
witnessed by the United Nations Special Representative.106 The
Bonn Agreement is more a sort of internal roadmap of the different
political and ethnical factions. The subsequent endorsement of the
text by the Security Council under a Chapter VI resolution

101.
Stahn, supra note 2, at 938-41.
102.
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 12-13 (2d ed., 2007).
103.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 19-23, May 23, 1969, 8
I.L.M. 679, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. These principles include coercion of a State by the
treaty or use of force. Id.
104.
See CHRISTINE BELL, ON THE LAW OF PEACE: PEACE AGREEMENTS AND THE
LEX PACIFICATORIA 105 (2008) (analyzing the common peace agreement in relation to
types of conflict); see also Stephen Neff, Conflict Termination and Peace-Making in the
Law of Nations: A Historical Perspective, in Jus POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF
TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE, supra note 5, at 77 (comparing the historical
and modern conceptual origins of jus post bellum); STEPHEN NEFF, WAR AND THE LAW
OF NATIONS 279-284 (2005) (discussing the rebirth of just wars).
105.
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the
Reestablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Dec. 5, 2001, http://www.un.org/
News/dhllatest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm [hereinafter Bonn Agreement].
106.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 105.
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transformed the document into an official Security Council
recommendation,1 0 7 but it remains a purely national document.
The prohibition on the acquisition of territory through the use of
force-a principle that is firmly embedded in international law-is
additional evidence of the balance of the rights of both parties.108
There is no need to add this standard to the list of principles for a just
termination of war. The vanquished state's territorial integrity
cannot be altered by the victors. Arguably, the Security Council,
when acting to maintain international peace and security, is the only
entity capable of altering territorial rights. 0 9 Similarly, the question
of reparations for the damages caused by the conflict is already
addressed in Article 3 of the Hague Regulation, which stipulates
unambiguously that a "belligerent party which violates the provisions
of the said Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay
compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts committed by
persons forming part of its armed forces.""10 The Draft Articles on
the Responsibilities of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
contain equally sufficient provisions in this regard.'
There is a tendency to establish mechanisms to implement the
responsibility to pay reparations either as a part of a peace treaty or
under a Security Council resolution.11 2 Although such post-war
reparations had comprised drastic effects on the lives of the
population in the past," 3 norms have evolved to limit the effects of
reparations.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, for example, provides that "[i]n no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence."114
Such limits and principles in respect of peace settlements and
agreements are already firmly established in international law. The
law of transition from a state of war to a state of peace is thus in
large parts covered by existing rules and principles. Of course, one
might note that the contents of peace agreements need to be
predetermined as a matter of law in addition to the existing
principles on reparations. These additional settlements would cover

107.
S.C. Res. 1383, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001).
108.
G.A. Res. 2734, U.N. Doc. A/RES/25/2734 (Dec. 16, 1970).
109.
For a discussion on this point, see DE BRABANDERE, supra note 34, at 68-70
(examining the conflict between Security Council action and domestic jurisdiction);
Frederic L. Kirgis, Security Council Governance of Postconflict Societies: A Plea for
Good Faith and Informed Decision Making, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 579 (2001).
110.
Hague Regulations, supra note 42, art. 3.
111.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on the Responsibilities of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Apr. 23-June 1 & July 2-Aug. 10,
2001).
112.
For example, see the United Nations Compensation Commission After the
Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, S.C. Res. 687, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 8, 1991).
113.
For a (historical) overview of post-war settlements, including after the
World Wars, see COGEN, supra note 77, at 150.
114.
G.A. Res. 2200A, art. 1, T 2, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Mar. 23, 1976).
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issues such as transitional justice, i.e. how to deal with past
crimes.11 5
However, there is no blueprint for reconstruction
processes. To continue with the example of transitional justice, the
most obvious-but not exclusive-method is to rely on tribunals,
which may be national, international, or mixed with differing levels of
international involvement.11 6 The overall objective of transitional
justice is accountability, but truth-finding, truth-telling, reparation,
and reconciliation may also be part of the process. The instruments,
therefore, vary widely from case to case according to the expectations
in the territories. In many cases, alternative mechanisms such as a
truth and/or reconciliation commissions have been established." 7
The accountability for past crimes, although vital in the
reconstruction process, thus cannot be part of a compulsory and
previously established framework. Moreover, such issues are best
addressed at the national rather than international level, taking into
account local culture and legal tradition.
2.

Rules and Principles of Post-Conflict Governance

Implementation of the mandate in accordance with relevant
Security Council resolutions or treaties remains the first and
foremost source of legal obligations, but additional obligations for
international and foreign actors can be found in both human rights
law and the laws of occupation" 8-the laws of occupation being
particularly important when their formal application is not contested,
such as in the case of Iraq. It does not seem necessary to resort to the
application of other legal concepts such as trusteeship to these
operations.1x9
Post-conflict administrations and peace building missions
principally draw their authority, and thus their international legal
obligations, from Security Council resolutions and international
treaties.120 Post-conflict administrations and peace building missions
do not operate in a legal vacuum, as their mandate delimits the

115.
See, e.g., Stahn, supra note 2, at 940 (proposing a principle for post-conflict
peace of shifting from collective criminal responsibility to individual criminal
responsibility).
116.
See, e.g., Bellamy, supra note 86, at 12-13 (discussing adjudication of war
crimes in international tribunals).
117.
See, e.g., United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, On
the Establishment of a Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, in East
Timor, § 3, U.N. Doc. UNTAET/REG/2001/10 (July 13, 2001) (describing the objectives
of the Commission on Reception, Truth and Reconciliation).
118.
Boon, supra note 61, at 292, 304.
119.
As suggested by Boon. Id. at 305.
120.
See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1885, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1885 (Sept. 15, 2009) (authorizing
a peacekeeping mission in Liberia).
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boundaries of their authority. In addition, human rights lawi2 ' and
the laws of armed conflict 1 22 provide adequate legal restraints on
foreign actor's conduct in such circumstances.
The problems
encountered under post-conflict peace-building missions with respect
to human rights and other violations are not a question of applicable
law but rather a question of accountability and the need to improve
it. It is unquestionable that the accountability of international
organizations performing administration functions still needs to be
improved, but there is no reason to change the human rights
obligations of international actors. Rather, establishing alternative
review mechanisms to determine the compatibility of certain official
acts with internationally recognized human rights standards,
particularly with respect to executive or military detention orders,
should be put in place.
The only additional set of legal rules that could be envisaged
would be a consequence of the application of a fiduciary or trusteeship
type of authority of post-conflict administrations.1 23 The idea of
121.
For more on the application of human rights law to international
organizations in post-conflict situations, see ROBERT KOLB ET AL., LAPPLICATION DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL HUMANITAIRE ET DES DROITS DE L'HOMME AUX ORGANISATIONS
INTERNATIONALES: FORCES DE PAIX ET ADMINISTRATIONS CIVILES TRANSITOIRES (2005);
Lindsey Cameron, Human Rights Accountability of International Civil Administrations
to the People Subject to Administration, 1 HUM. RTS. & INT'L LEGAL DISCOURSE 267
(2007) (discussing limitations upon international organizations engaged in peace
operations and civil administration and proposing mechanisms to protect local
populations); J. Cerone, Reasonable Measures in Unreasonable Circumstances:a Legal
Responsibility Framework for Human Rights Violations in Post-conflict Territories
Under UN Administration, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONSLEGAL ISSUES 469-71 (N.M Blokker & H.G. Schermers eds., 2001); Eric De Brabandere,
Human Rights Accountability of InternationalAdministrations Theory and Practice in
East Timor, in ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS (JAN Wouters et al. eds., forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 2-11)
(discussing the paradox that no international organizations is bound by an
international human rights treaty and describing other forms of limitations upon
international organizations). On the application of human rights to foreign military
forces, see John Cerone, Minding the Gap: Outlining KFOR Accountability in PostConflict Kosovo, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L 469 (2001) (delineating the various types of
international law that apply to KFOR); Wilde, supra note 100; Ralph Wilde, Legal
"Blackhole'? ExtraterritorialState Action and InternationalTreaty Law on Civil and
Political Rights, 26 MICH. J. INT'L L. 739 (2005) (examining post-9/11 policy on
extraterritorial activity by states and the law that governs such activity).
122.
See T. H. Irmscher, The Legal Framework for the Activities of the United
Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo: The Charter, Human Rights, and
the Law of Occupation, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 353, 354 (2001) (discussing the legal
constraints on the UN's use of force); Kelly et.al., Legal Aspects of Australia's
Involvement in the International Force for East Timor, 841 INT'L REV. OF THE RED
CROSS 101 (2001) (analyzing the international legal framework of the U.N. operation in
East Timor).
123.
See Bernhard Knoll, Legitimacy and UN-Administration of Territory, 8
GERMAN L.J. 39, 45 (2007) (describing a fiduciary duty in relation to the occupation of
Kosovo); Carstan Stahn, International Territorial Administration in the Former
Yugoslavia: Origins, Developments and Challenges Ahead, 61 ZEITSCHRIPr FUR
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fiduciary authority originates from the private law institution of
trust, which implies that a person, called the trustee, holds property
for and on behalf of another person. 124 Trust also implies that the
trustee exercises these rights for the benefit of the other person. The
main differences between individual trusteeships and international
trusteeships is that, in the latter case, the trustee is not a private
person but a state or an international organization and the object of
the trust is not property but administering authority over a state or
territory. 125 The principle that international actors administer the
territory on behalf and for the benefit of the population, and not for
themselves, is very relevant but is not a consequence of the
application of the concept of trust or the fiduciary character of the
authority. When the laws of occupation apply, the notion of trust is
encompassed by the usufructuary nature of the occupier's
authority.126 The existence of such an obligation outside the formal
application of the laws relating to foreign occupation can be derived
from the relevant Security Council Resolutions and the context in
which these missions were established. The provision of basic civil
services, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction, as well as the longterm objectives, is obviously intended for the population and for the
international community that has entrusted the Security Council
with the maintenance of international peace and security. The
objectives of such missions thus imply governance on behalf of and for
the benefit of the population. In addition, peace building missions
and international post-conflict administrations are, by definition,

AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHTS UND VOLKERRECHTS 107, 114 (2001)
(discussing modern day examples of the principle of trusteeship).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. f (2003).
124.
HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 566 (1951). Judge
125.
McNair, in a separate opinion in the South West Africa case, identified several general
principles which can be derived from the notion of trust in private law, and which could
be applied in international law:
(a) That the control of the trustee, tuteur or curateur over the property is
limited in one way or another; he is not in the position of the normal complete
owner, who can do what he likes with his own, because he is precluded from
administering the property for his own personal benefit;
(b) That the trustee, tuteur or curateur is under some kind of legal obligation,
based on confidence and conscience, to carry out the trust or mission confided
to him for the benefit of some other person or for some public purpose;
(c) That any attempt by one of these persons to absorb the property entrusted
to him into his own patrimony would be illegal and would be prevented by the
law.
International Status of South West Africa, Advisory Opinion, 1950 I.C.J. REP. 128, 149
(July 11) (separate opinion by Sir Arnold McNair). In that particular case however, this
referred to the mandates system of the League of Nations and the UN Trusteeship
System. It is doubtful whether these principles apply to every form of international
administration.
Roberts, supranote 47, at 295.
126.
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temporary in nature. This is mainly a direct consequence of the fact
that these recent operations were established by the Security Council
under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. 2 7 Chapter VII
allows the Security Council to take measures aimed at maintaining or
restoring international peace and security. Once international peace
and security are re-established or a threat to international peace and
security no longer exists, the mission must by definition come to an
end.128 This is in accordance with the central aim of modern peace
building missions and international administrations. The powers
granted are exercised with specific purposes-reconstructing states
emerging from years of conflict or internal strife and creating stable
institutions as a method of maintaining international peace and
security.
The basic principles derived from the fiduciary character of the
authority can nevertheless be seen as applicable only in a subsidiary
manner in cases of ambiguities or uncertainties in the mandate. In
these events, the fiduciary character can be seen as a useful method
of interpretation of the mandate. The administering authority,
however, remains primarily bound by the main objectives of the
missions, and the mandates under Security Council Resolutions take
precedence over the fiduciary principle.

V. CONCLUSION

The importance of post-conflict settlements and the need to move
beyond the mere maintenance of a status quo in cases of potential
threats to international stability, peace, and security cannot be
doubted. Such a shift lies at the basis of the expanding activity of
international organizations in post-conflict situations. However, the
legal implications of such evolution must be curtailed. The neutral
approach towards the post-conflict reconstruction process, as distinct
from the issues of both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, must be
maintained.
Recent practice shows that, notwithstanding clear
controversies as to the legality of the use of force, there was almost
unanimity about the need to have a genuine reconstruction process.
In Iraq, for example, the only quandary was related to the scale of
United Nations' and United States' involvement in this process. 2 9

127.
U.N. Charter art. 39.
128.
For a similar analysis, see generally Michael Bothe & Thilo Marauhn, The
United Nations in Kosovo and East Timor- Problems of a Trusteeship Administration,
6 IN'L PEACEKEEPING 152 (2000).
129.
James Glantz, Official History Spotlights Iraq Rebuilding Blunders, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 13, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/world/middleeastll4reconstruct.
html?_r-i; see also Greg Bruno, Rebuilding Iraq, BACKGROUNDER, Jan. 17, 2008,
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This Article has shown that jus post bellum theories that link postconflict reconstruction to the legality of the intervention or change
the rights and obligations of actors in post-conflict reconstruction
according to the legality of the intervention are not only unacceptable
but also run contrary to current international law and practice. Any
attempt to transpose or impose legal obligations on intervening
states-whether implicitly or explicitly-aims at evaluating the
legality of a military intervention as a function of the potential
positive outcomes of the post bellum effects.
If one takes the notion of jus post bellum as a law after conflict
(or to fill an alleged normative gap) with no reference to the resort to
force, the added value of the notion seems rather limited. It is then
used only as an alternative for the existing legal framework, which
consists principally of international treaties and Security Council
resolutions that contain the basic norms and mandate for the exercise
of post-conflict authority. Limits inherent to treaty law and the
power of the Security Council when exercising its responsibility in the
maintenance of international peace and security are also applicable
when dealing with post-conflict zones. Beyond the rules relating to
the mandate and what foreign states and international organizations
are allowed to do after conflicts, other rules and principles apply to
the conduct of these foreign actors. Human rights, the laws of
occupation, and, in a subsidiary manner, the principle of trust form
an adequate and already existing legal framework. There is neither a
need to depart from existing rules and principles nor any utility in
categorizing already existing norms in this respect.

http://www.cfr.org/publication/15019/ ("Significant financial challenges also remain. The $45
billion pot of U.S. money is 75 percent obligated; more money is needed.").

